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TRUSTS-LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS-CONTINGENT UNFUNDED LIFE INSUR-
ANCE TRUST AS TESTAMENTARY D1spos1TION-Settlor named defendant bank 
beneficiary of eight insurance policies on his life. At the same time he 
entered into a trust agreement with the bank under which the bank was to 
hold the policies until the death of the settlor and, upon his death, collect 
the proceeds and distribute them according to one of two alternate methods 
of distribution. If his wife elected to reject the provisions made for her in 
his will and insisted on her statutory share of his estate, then the insurance 
proceeds were to be divided info four equal parts and paid to his four 
daughters. If, however, the wife elected to take under the will (under 
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which she received about one-fifth of the estate), the insurance money was 
to be divided into five equal parts to be paid to his wife and four daugh-
ters. Settlor died some two and a half years later leaving both the will and 
trust agreement still in force although he had reserved the right to revoke 
the trust at any time. His widow attacked the trust agreement as testa-
mentary and prayed that the trustee be ordered to pay over the proceeds 
of the policies to the executor of the settlor's estate. A demurrer by the 
trustee and other defendants was sustained, and the widow appealed. 
Held, three justices dissenting, since during the life of the settlor no legal 
interest passed to the trustee and no equitable interest passed to the bene-
ficiaries of the trust, the instrument was void as a testamentary disposition 
not executed in accordance with the statute of wills. Bickers v. Shenandoah 
Valley Nat. Bank, (Va. 1955) 88 S.E. (2d) 889. 
In view of the widespread use and undoubted value of the insurance 
trust in the field of estate planning,1 the cloud which this decision casts on 
the validity of such trusts in Virginia is to be regretted. The statement of 
the court that no interest passed to the trustee during the life of the settlor 
is certainly an anomaly in view of the fact that the trustee was named bene-
ficiary of the life insurance policies. Though often referred to as a "mere 
expectancy,''2 and having few of the earmarks of a property interest, the 
interest which the beneficiary of a life insurance policy has in the proceeds 
has always been recognized as sufficient to keep such policies out of the 
category of testamentary dispositions. In support of its holding on this 
point the court cited language in the trust agreement which seemed to 
indicate that the trustee did not have any rights in the policies prior to 
the death of the settlor.3 The fallacy in this, of course, is that the trust 
agreement was in no way concerned with any transfer to the trustee. That 
had already been accomplished the moment the trustee was made benefi-
ciary of the policies. The trust agreement dealt only with the duties of 
the trustee toward this "expectancy," which the court readily conceded 
could have been made the subject matter of a trust if it had been trans-
ferred to the trustee.4 The second ground upon which the decision rested 
is equally open to criticism. The court took the view that since the trust 
was dependent on the existence of a valid will (and thus the beneficiaries 
l For interesting discussions of the practical advantages of life insurance trusts from 
the insurance man's point of view, see Nippert, "Contingent Life Insurance Trusts," 5 
J. AM. Soc. C.L.U. 166 (1951); Stephenson, "Reappraising Insurance Trusts," 4 J. AM. 
Soc. C.L.U. 218 (1950). , 
2 Smith v. Coleman, 184 Va. 259, 35 S.E. (2d) 107 (1945); Walker v. Penick's Executor, 
122 Va. 664, 95 S.E. 428 (1918); Davis v. Modem Industrial Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 18 N.E. 
(2d) 639 (1939). A minority of courts speak of the beneficiary's interest as vested subject 
to defeasance. See, e.g., Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 101 N.E. 289 
(1913). 
3 "The trustee's only rights in the trust and policies placed in safekeeping prior to 
the death of the settler, are to hold the policies in safekeeping until and unless they are 
withdrawn by the settler." Principal case at 893-894, n. I. 
4 Principal case at 892. The proposition that the right of the beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy to recover the proceeds may be held in trust has been uniformly affirmed. 
See, e.g.: Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Gordon v. 
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could not be ascertained until after the death of the settlor), no equitable 
interest in the corpus of the trust passed to anyone in the lifetime of the 
settlor. As the dissenting opinion forcefully pointed out, the trust instru-
ment transferred "contingent springing limitations" to the wife and four 
daughters of the settlor.5 The overwhelming weight of authority recognizes 
a contingent interest passing to the beneficiary as sufficient to support an 
inter vivos trust, 6 and the fact that the contingency will not take place until 
after the death of the settlor should not make the interest any less a present 
one. It is true that possession and enjoyment of the insurance proceeds by 
the beneficiaries of the trust was dependent on the existence of a will, but 
if a contingent interest is recognized as a subject of present ownership, it 
is misleading to say that the trust itself was dependent on the will. 
As several authorities have pointed out, any insurance trust is at least 
very similar to a testamentary disposition, but due to the fact that the 
danger of fraud is almost non-existent, the policy of the law has uniformly 
been to uphold such trusts as useful and legitimate devices for disposing of 
insurance proceeds.7 There is nothing in the court's opinion which indi-
cates a different view of the insurance trust per se. On the contrary, the 
court went to some length to limit its holding to the facts of the case.8 The 
fact that the trust was designed to avoid the operation of the Virginia 
statute giving a surviving spouse a one-third share of a decedent's estate9 
may have played some part in the result reached, although the court spe-
cifically reserved this question.10 If, in a later case, the Virginia court does 
decide that a revocable trust is void when attacked by a surviving spouse, 
it will be going against the result reached in the great majority of the 
jurisdictions which have encountered that situation.11 Considering these 
factors along with the strong dissent by three justices, it is not likely that 
this decision will mean the end of the insurance trust in Virginia. In the 
future, however, draftsmen of such trust instruments, in Virginia as else-
where, would do well to express clearly the intent to transfer (1) a present 
interest to the trustee and, (2) a present, equitable interest to designated 
beneficiaries. In addition, if alternate methods of distribution are desired, 
as in the grincipal case, one of them should be definitely prescribed with 
the alternative plan phrased in terms of condition subsequent. 
Jerome K. Walsh, Jr. 
Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P. (2d) 653 (1954), noted in Z7 ROCKY MT. L. 
REv. 240 (1955). 
5 Principal case at 902. 
6 SCOlT, LAW OF TRUSTS §56.5 (1939); BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §38 (1952). 
7 SMITH, PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS 75 (1950); SCOlT, LAw OF ThuSTS §57.3 
(1939); Phillips, "The Testamentary Character of Personal Unfunded Life Insurance 
Trusts," 82 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 700 (1934). 
s Principal case at 895-896. 
9 Va. Code (1950) tit. 64, §§64-13, 64-16. 
10 See note 8 supra. 
11 See 40 GEO. L.J. 109 (1951). 
